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Abstract.  This paper presents a linear programming model that allocates the waters of 
the Euphrates and Tigris rivers to agricultural and urban uses in the three riparian 
countries – Turkey, Syria, and Iraq – while maximizing the net aggregate benefits from 
these activities while accounting for water conveyance costs.  Cooperative game theory 
concepts (core, Shapley value) are used to identify stable water allocations, under which 
all three countries find it beneficial to cooperate. 
   1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Mesopotamia region, within the boundaries of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, is 
populated by different ethnic, national, and religious groups, which have long fought over 
the control of its fertile lands.  Since the early 1970’s, there has been an increase in 
tension among these countries regarding the sharing of the waters of the Euphrates and 
Tigris rivers.  In particular, Turkey’s development of Southeastern Anatolia, with water 
needed for agricultural and energy production projects, has been viewed as a threat to 
Syria and Iraq.  This water problem is likely to be exacerbated in the future because of 
high population growth and urban development.  To help analyze these issues, this paper 
formulates a water allocation optimization model, that represents, in network form, the 
system made of the two rivers and their various consumption (agriculture, urban centers, 
hydropower plants) and transshipment nodes, including the possibility of transferring 
water from the Euphrates to the Tigris.  This model maximizes the aggregate net benefits 
of the three countries, including the gross benefits from water uses in agriculture, urban 
functions, and hydroelectricity, minus the costs of water conveyance.  Cooperative game 
theory concepts (core, Shapley value) are used to identify stable water allocations, under 
which all three countries find it beneficial to cooperate.  These analyses are carried out 
under different scenarios related to future energy prices, agricultural production 
efficiency, and total water availability.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The structure of the model is 
described in Section 2.  The results of a benchmark application are presented in Section 
3.  Cooperative game theory applications are analyzed in Section 4.  Section 5 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. STRUCTURE OF THE EUPHRATES AND TIGRIS RIVER BASIN MODEL 
    (ETRBM) 
The existing literature on the Euphrates and the Tigris focuses on water politics, 
legal analyses, and water balances, but does not provide any model for the overall 
optimal utilization of the basin resources. In the general water resources literature, only a 
few studies focus on their optimum allocation at the national and international levels. 
Among them, four bear connections to the ETRBM: Booker & Young (1994), Dinar &   2 
Wolf (1994a, 1994b), and Rogers (1969, 1993). With regard to the river basin system 
structure, the ETRBM is similar to the model developed by Booker and Young (1994) for 
the Colorado river (CRIM - Colorado River Institutional Model). They use a nonlinear 
framework and account for salinity. Their goal is to allocate scarce water resources 
among states by creating a water market. In contrast, the ETRBM is designed as a linear 
program where water is allocated to agricultural and urban demand nodes in the three 
countries, subject to upper and lower limits to nodal water allocations. Rogers (1969) 
uses linear programming to compute the optimum benefits of different coalitions in the 
international setting of the Ganges, and then evaluates the results in a nonzero-sum game 
for two countries (East Pakistan and India). Incorporating Nepal into his analysis, Rogers 
(1994) outlines the applicability of cooperative game theory and Pareto frontier analyses 
to water resources allocation problems. The ETRBM, on the other hand, involves 
extensive applications of core and Shapley value analyses to the ETRB.  Dinar & Wolf 
(1994) and Wolf and Dinar (1994) illustrate the potential of water trading among Middle 
East countries (mainly Egypt and Israel), accounting for political constraints. They 
consider coalition alternatives but do not search for core solutions.  
 
2.1. Spatial Structure of the ETRBM 
The ETRBM includes 63 demand (i) and 45 supply (j) nodes (Figures 1). The 
supply nodes provide water for both urban and agricultural uses, and each demand node 
is served by only one supply node, taken as the most accessible node.  Out of the 45 
ETRBM supply nodes, 17 are in the Euphrates basin, and 28 in the Tigris basin. Turkey 
has 15 supply nodes: 5 in the Euphrates and 10 in the Tigris basins. Syria has 7 supply 
nodes, all in the Euphrates basin. Iraq has 22 supply nodes, 4 in the Euphrates and 18 in 
the Tigris basins. Node 45 represents the Gulf, which is assigned to Iraq, and represents 
the end point of all flows downstream There are three inter-basin links, all from the Tigris 
to the Euphrates, with one already built (from j=31 to j=16, the Tharthar Canal – see 
Bilen, 1994). While one link connects Turkey to Syria (from j=21 to j=12), the other two 
links are located within the borders of Iraq (from j=28 to j=14 and from j=31 to j=16).  
Of the 63 demand nodes, 37 are in the Euphrates basin: 16 for urban uses and 21 for 
agricultural uses. Of the 26 demand nodes in the Tigris basin, 10 are for urban uses and   3 
16 for agriculture uses. Syria has 16 demand nodes, all of which are in the Euphrates 
basin, whereas Turkey and Iraq have 13 and 8 demand nodes in the Euphrates basin, and 
11 and 15 demand nodes in the Tigris basin, respectively.  
       
 
Figure 1: The Euphrates and Tigris River Basin Diagram  
   4 
 
2.2. Mathematical Structure of the ETRBM 
We first present the model equations, followed by the definitions of all the 
indices, variables, and parameters, and by a discussion of the objective function and 
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i:      demand nodes (1 to 63)   
j & l:      supply nodes (1 to 45) 
agr:  set of agricultural demand nodes 
urb:  set of urban demand nodes 
inc:  all supply nodes, except the Gulf   5 
 
Variables 
NEB:        total benefit net of transportation costs    ($) 
PQj,l:  internodal flow  (node j to node l)                                             (Mm
3)   
PQ21,12:  total water transfer from Turkey to Syria through the link project 21 to 12  (Mm
3) 
PQ28,14:  total water transfer from Turkey to Iraq through the link project 28 to 14  (Mm
3) 
PQ31,16:  total water transfer from Turkey to Iraq through the link project 31 to 16  (Mm
3) 
Qj:      total water flowing out of node j towards downstream nodes  (Mm
3) 
Wj,i:  water transferred from supply node j to demand node i      (Mm
3) 




AGRTC:      agricultural water transport unit cost             ($ per Mm
3-km) 
URBTC:      urban water transport unit cost                 ($ per Mm
3-km) 
VALAG:      agriculture water unit value                       ($ per Mm
3) 
VALUR:      urban water unit value                        ($ per Mm
3) 
CTSS:       internodal water transport unit cost               ($ per Mm
3-km) 
DSDj,i:  distance from supply node j to demand node i  (km) 
DSSj,l:  distance from supply node j to supply node l  (km) 
EPR:          energy price for electricity                  ($  per MWh) 
EGj:  electric generation capacities for the dam at supply node j  (MWh per Mm
3) 
MINAGR:   minimum agricultural consumption rate            (Mm
3 per ha) 
MAXAGR:  maximum agricultural consumption rate            (Mm
3 per ha) 
MINURB:   minimum urban consumption rate                   (Mm
3 per inhabitant) 
MAXURB:  maximum urban consumption rate                   (Mm
3 per inhabitant) 
RELj:  reservoir evaporation loss at supply node j       (Mm
3) 
RFRi,j:  return flow rates from demand node i to supply node j   
SIZEi:   size of demand node i (hectare for agricultural nodes, inhabitants for urban nodes) 
TFj:     tributary and groundwater inflows at node j     (Mm
3) 
FTRNSSj,l:  feasibility of the link from node j to l  (if feasible 1, otherwise 0) 
FTRNSDj,i:  feasibility of the link from node j to i  (if feasible 1, otherwise 0) 
M:  very large number    
 
Let VALAG be the unit value of water to agriculture, and let WTi be the water 
consumption at agricultural node i. Then the total value of the water at i is VALAG⋅ WTi, 
and the total value of the water to all agricultural nodes is ∑ i∈ agrVALAG⋅ WTi. If Wji is the 
amount of water transferred from node j to node i, DSDji the distance between the nodes, 
and  AGRTC the transportation unit cost per unit distance (assumed to be spatially 
invariant), then the total water transport cost of getting water to node i is  
∑ jWji⋅  DSDji⋅  AGRTC, and the total water transportation cost to all agricultural nodes is 
∑ i∈ agr∑ j Wji⋅  DSDji⋅  AGRTC. Hence the net benefits of water usage to agriculture is   6 
AGRTC DSD W WT VALAG i j agr j i j agr i ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ∑ ∑ , , ,      (11) 
Similarly to water used in agriculture, let VALUR be the unit value of water to 
urban uses, and let WTi be the water consumption at urban node i. Then the total value of 
the water at i is VALUR⋅ WTi, and the total value of the water to all urban nodes is 
∑ i∈ urbVALAG⋅ WTi. If Wji is the amount of water transferred from node j to node i, DSDji 
the distance between the nodes, and URBTC the transportation unit cost per unit distance 
(assumed to be spatially invariant), then the total water transport cost of getting water to 
node i is ∑ jWji⋅ DSDji⋅ AGRTC, and the total water transportation cost to all urban nodes is 
∑ i∈ urb∑ jWji⋅ DSDji⋅ AGRTC. Hence the net benefits of water usage to urban centers is 
URBTC DSD W WT VALUR i j urb j i j urb i ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ∑ ∑ , , ,      (12) 
  Energy benefits are measured by the market value of the energy generated by the 
downstream flow of water. Let EPR be the unit market price of water-generated energy, 
EGj the quantity of energy generated at node j per unit of water flow, and PQjl the flow of 
water into downstream node l from node j. Then the value of the energy generated at j by 
releasing water to downstream node l is EPR⋅ EGj⋅ PQjl. The total value of energy 
generated in the basin is then  
∑ ⋅ ⋅
l j l j j PQ EG EPR
, ,         ( 1 3 )  
In the cases of interbasin water transfer links, let PQjl be the flow of water from 
node j into downstream node l, DSSjl the distance between the supply nodes, and CTSS 
the transportation unit cost per unit distance (assumed to be spatially invariant) between 
the two river basins for those links. Because there are only three links, they are explicitly 
represented by their indices. The costs are assumed born by the country receiving the 
water. Let PQ21,12 be the water flowing from Turkey to Syria, and PQ28,14 and PQ31,16 the 
water flows within Iraq. The transportation cost for link j-l is then PQjl⋅ CTSS⋅ DSSjl. The 
total interbasin link costs are then calculated as follows:  
) ( ) ( ) ( 12 , 21 12 , 21 16 , 31 16 , 31 14 , 28 14 , 28 DSS CTSS PQ DSS CTSS PQ DSS CTSS PQ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅  (14) 
Combining the benefits and costs in Equations (11) – (14) yields the objective function 
represented by Equation (1).   7 
Equation (2) computes the total water delivery to demand node i, WTi, as the sum 
of the deliveries Wji from all supply nodes j to node i. The water inputs to supply node j 
are the tributary inflows TFj, the return flows from the upstream withdrawals TRFNj, 
taken as the sum of the products of return flow rates and withdrawals at node i, 
∑ iRFRij⋅ WTi, and water from upstream nodes l to j, ∑ lPQlj. The total input at node j is  
∑ ∑ + + ⋅
l j l j i i j i PQ TF WT RFR , ,        ( 1 5 )  
On the other hand, water leaving node j is allocated to reservoir evaporation RELj, water 
withdrawal for agricultural and urban uses Wj,i, and water release to downstream nodes 
Qj.  Then the total amount of water leaving node j is  
j j i j i REL Q W + + ∑ ,          ( 1 6 )  
Combining Equations (15) and (16) leads to the water balance constraint (3) at node j.  
The parameter SIZEi is a measure of the size of demand node i (either urban or 
agriculture), and MINAGR, MINURB, MAXAGR, MAXURB  represent minimum usage 
rates – to sustain agricultural and urban activities – and  maximum usage rates – to 
prevent excessive withdrawals. The total water consumption at node i, ∑ j W ji, is noted 
WTi, and is constrained by Equations (4) – (7).  In Equation (8), Qj is expressed as the 
sum of all water flows released from node j to downstream nodes l, equal to ∑ l PQjl. 
Equations (9) and (10) eliminates infeasible supply-to-supply and supply-to-demand node 
linkages by using the 0-1 parameters FTRNSSjl   a  and FTRNSDjl..    
  The procedures for estimating the model input parameters are fully described in 
Kucukmehmetoglu (2002).  They involve regional and general data sources.  Supply data, 
including tributary and return flows, and evaporation rates, were drawn from Kolars 
(1986, 1992, 1994), Kliot (1994), Bagis (1989), and Altinbilek (1997).  Demand data 
were drawn from Kolars (1992), Kliot (1994), Altinbilek (1997), the CIA (1998), Dinar 
and Wolf (1994), Wolf and Dinar (1994), Howitt, Mann, and Vaux (1982), and Howe 
and Easter (1971).  Finally, transportation cost and energy data were drawn from 
Hirshleifer et al. (1969), Gibbons (1986), and Bilen (1994).  
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3. BENCHMARK MODEL APPLICATION  
We assume that all three countries have the same agricultural efficiency (VALAG 
=$25,000 /Mm
3), the same energy price (EPR = $25/Mwh), and that total tributary flows 
are average (TTF = 81.9 Billion M
3).  Table 1 presents the net overall system benefit 
(NEB), the gross benefits form water use (TECBW) and from energy generation 
(TECBE), the total water transportation costs for urban uses (TTCURB) and for 
agricultural uses (TTCAGR), and the cost of interbasin transfer (TTRSS ). The table also 
includes the total tributary flows (TFT), the total reserve evaporation (RELT), the water 
released to the Gulf (GULF), the total water withdrawal (TWT), the total return flow 
(FRET), the total in-out balance (TOTBAL), the total agricultural water withdrawal 
(TWAGR), the minimum required total water withdrawal for agriculture (TWAGRMIN), 
the maximum total water withdrawal for agriculture (TWAGRMAX), the total urban 
water withdrawal (TWURB), the minimum required total water withdrawal for urban use 
(TWURBMIN), and the maximum total water withdrawal for urban use (TWURBMAX). 
We observe that (1) energy benefits constitute nearly 50% of overall returns, (2) return 
flows make up almost 50% of the water input from tributaries, and are available for 
reuse, and (3) total water withdrawal is very close to the total tributary flow input, 
whereas water released to the Gulf makes up to 35% of the total tributary inflow.  
 
Table 1: General Summary of the Benchmark Solution 
 
 
  Table 2 presents the benefits for the overall system and each country, and includes 
total economic benefits (TECB), total transportation costs (TTC), net economic benefits 
(NBEN), the ratios of economic benefits to transportation costs (R), the percentage of 
economic benefits by category (PTECBW: all withdrawals; PTECBE: energy; 
PTECBWU: withdrawals for urban uses; PTECBWA: withdrawals for agricultural uses), 
and the percentages of transportation costs by use (PTTCURB: urban; PTTCAGR: 
NEB 2,407,731,200 $     TFT 81,920    Mm
3 TWAGR 77,505       Mm
3
TECBW 2,091,003,000 $     RELT 17,750    Mm
3 TWAGRMIN -            Mm
3
TECBE 1,175,087,800 $     GULF 28,225    Mm
3 TWAGRMAX 122,519     Mm
3
TTCURB 32,145,138 $          TWT 78,528    Mm
3 TWURB 1,022         Mm
3
TTCAGR 826,214,547 $        FRET 42,582    Mm
3 TWURBMIN -            Mm
3
TTRSS - $                      TOTBAL -          Mm
3 TWURBMAX 1,881         Mm
3  9 
agriculture; PTTRSS: inter-basin). Although the net benefits of Turkey and Iraq are close, 
Turkey derives most of her benefits (75%) from energy generation, and Iraq from 
agriculture (90%). The overall system optimization involves, first, the utilization of the 
energy generation potential at the upstream nodes, and then the utilization of the 
agricultural potential at the downstream nodes. The opportunity cost of withdrawing 
water at the upstream nodes is higher than that of withdrawing water at the downstream 
nodes. In Syria, the benefits are almost equally shared (56% for water withdrawals and 
44% for energy generation).  The ratios of benefits to costs show that Turkey has the 
lowest transport cost related to water withdrawal, and Iraq the highest.  Urban 
transportation costs constitute a small share of total transportation costs in the whole 
system and in each county.   
 
Table 2: Summary of the Components of  Country Benefits 
 
 
  Tables 3 and 4 present the optimum water allocations by country (t=Turkey, 
s=Syria, i=Iraq), basin (e=Euphrates, t=Tigris), and use (a=agriculture, u=urban). The 
highest withdrawal (61,934 Mm
3) is for agriculture in Iraq. Turkey, with the second 
largest agricultural land (nearly two thirds of Iraqi land), withdraws only one sixth of 
Iraqi withdrawal (10,263 Mm
3).  Urban withdrawals (1,022 Mm
3) are significantly lower 
than agricultural withdrawal (77,505 Mm
3). 
 
4. COOPERATION AND CONFLICT: GAME – THEORETIC ANALYSES  
 
4.1.   Individual and Coalition Strategies 
Figure 2 illustrates country interactions under the different possible configurations of 
coalition/cooperation. Figure 2.a illustrates the case of independent, individual action 
TECB 3,266,090,800 $     TECBt 1,161,095,600 $     TECBs 294,048,029 $     TECBi 1,810,947,300 $    
TTC 858,359,685 $        TTCt 144,065,122 $        TTCs 60,237,792 $       TTCi 654,056,771 $       
NBEN 2,407,731,200 $     NBENt 1,017,030,400 $     NBENs 233,810,237 $     NBENi 1,156,890,500 $    
R 3.81                       Rt 8.06                       Rs 4.88                    Ri 2.77                      
PTECBW 64.0% PTECBWt 24.6% PTECBWs 56.3% PTECBWi 90.5%
PTECBE 36.0% PTECBEt 75.4% PTECBEs 43.7% PTECBEi 9.5%
PTECBWU 4.7% PTECBWUt 3.0% PTECBWUs 2.9% PTECBWUi 6.1%
PTECBWA 59.3% PTECBWAt 21.6% PTECBWAs 53.3% PTECBWAi 84.5%
PTTCURB 3.7% PTTCURBt 7.6% PTTCURBs 4.7% PTTCURBi 2.8%
PTTCAGR 96.3% PTTCAGRt 92.4% PTTCAGRs 95.3% PTTCAGRi 97.2%
PTTRSS 0.0% PTTRSSt 0.0% PTTRSSs 0.0% PTTRSSi 0.0%
All Countries Turkey Syria Iraq  10 
Table 3: Water Resources Allocation by 
Country, Basin, and Use 
Table 4: Water Resources Allocation 




by each country. In Step 1, Turkey optimally utilizes the resources in its border. Next, in 
Step 2, Syria, taking the return flows and released water from Turkey as exogenously 
determined (in Step 1), optimally utilizes this exogenous input and the resources within 
its border. Finally, in Step 3, Iraq optimally utilizes its internal resources and the water 
inputs from Turkey and Syria (released and return flow waters), as determined in Steps 1 
and 2. The step sequence clearly reflects the dominance of upstream countries over 
downstream countries. In Figure 4.b, the various two-country coalitions are presented. 
The  first  diagram displays the Turkish and Syrian coalition, with Iraq acting 
independently. In Step 1, Turkey and Syria utilizes the resources available within their 
territories jointly and optimally. In Step 2, Iraq optimizes the use of the resources 
available within its territory, together with the exogenous input from Turkey and Syria. 
The  second  diagram presents the Syrian and Iraqi coalition, with Turkey acting 
independently. In Step 1, Turkey optimally uses the available resources within its 
territory, and releases the unused water for the Syrian and Iraqi coalition, which takes this 
input as exogenous, and optimally uses all its available resources. The last  diagram 
explains the interactions between the Turkey-Iraq coalition, and Syria acting 
independently. Because both the coalition and Syria are affected by each other’s 
decisions and output, a stable solution is represented by a Nash equilibrium, which is 
reached when the sequential optimizations stop because there is no longer any change in 
their solutions.   Figure 4.c illustrates the grand coalition, which is equivalent to the 
benchmark model.   
 
WTteu 45          
WTtea 3,402      WTte 3,447     
WTttu 190        
WTtta 6,626      WTtt 6,816      WTt 10,263   
WTseu 58          
WTsea 6,273      WTse 6,331      WTs 6,331     
WTieu 78          
WTiea 25,800    WTie 25,878   
WTitu 652        
WTita 35,405    WTit 36,057    WTi 61,934   
WTtu 235          
WTsu 58            
WTiu 730           WTu 1,022     
WTta 10,028      
WTsa 6,273        
 WTia 61,205       WTa 77,505     11 
 
 
Figure 2: Country Interactions Under Different Configurations of  
               Independence and Cooperation 
 
The ETRBM is appropriately adjusted to reflect the optimization decisions of individual 
countries and coalitions of countries.  The derived optimal benefits are defined below: 
 
NEBt  net economic benefit of Turkey 
NEBs  net economic benefit of Syria                      
NEBi  net economic benefit of Iraq                       
NEBts  net economic benefit of Turkey and Syria           
NEBiTS  net economic benefit of Iraq given the TS coalition        
NEBtiS  net economic benefit of Turkey and Iraq given Syria’s action  
NEBsTI  net economic benefit of Syria given the TI coalition            
NEBsi  net economic benefit of Syria and Iraq             
NEBtsi  net economic benefit of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq      




Diagram 1 Diagram 2 Diagram 3
b. Two-Country Coalitions
Step 1 Step 1 Step V=T+1
Step T=V+1
Step 2 Step 2


























S  12 
4.2.   Core, Shapley Value, and Subsidy Determination 
Consider the total benefits of the grand coalition, NEBtsi. This is clearly the 
maximum aggregate benefit achievable by the three countries. The problem is to allocate 
this aggregate benefit among the three countries in a way that will persuade them to 
accept this allocation. Let Xt, Xs, and Xi be the benefits allocated to Turkey, Syria, and 
Iraq, respectively. This allocation should then verify that 
NEBtsi X X X i s t = + +         (17) 
This allocation, to be sustainable, should verify both individual and coalition rationality 
constraints, so that no country acting alone or within a coalition, has an incentive to reject 
the allocation. The three coalition constraints are straightforwardly represented by 
Equations (22) – (24). The case of the individual rationality constraints is a little more 
complicated. Indeed, a given country c may act individually under two situations: (a) the 
other two countries also act individually, and (b) they act as a coalition. The benefits to 
country c under these two situations need not be the same. We assume that country c 
aims at guaranteeing to itself the minimum of these two benefits, hence the formulation 
of the constraints (19) – (21).  
  The equality (17) and inequalities (19) – (24) may or may not have a solution. In 
order to find out, the standard approach is to transform this system of 
inequalities/equality into a linear program (LP), by maximizing or minimizing any linear 
function of the variables (Xt, Xs, Xi). If the LP has no solution, then the system of in 
inequalities/equality has no solution, and the core is empty. A variation on this approach 
is to modify Equation (17) by introducing a new variable, Z, leading to Equation (25), 
and to use as the LP objective function Z. Hence, the LP is represented by Equations (18) 
– (25):     
 
Maximize            
  Z F =            ( 1 8 )  
subject to 
                          
min ) , min( NEBt NEBtSI NEBt X t = ≥      (19) 
                           ()
min , min NEBs NEBsTI NEBs X s = ≥      (20)   13 
        ()
min , min NEBi NEBiTS NEBi X i = ≥        (21) 
      NEBts X X s t ≥ +          ( 2 2 )  
                 NEBti X X i t ≥ +          ( 2 3 )  
        NEBsi X X i s ≥ +          ( 2 4 )  
NEBtsi Z X X X i s t = + + +          ( 2 5 )  
   
  If the optimal Z* is strictly equal to zero, then the core exists but is reduced to 
only one point, i.e., only one allocation is acceptable. If Z* is positive, the core is non-
empty and made of an infinite number of feasible allocations. The allocation obtained 
with Z* is sustainable and allows a supra-governmental authority to extract the maximum 
benefits from the three countries for saving for future use. In this case, Z* can be viewed 
as the maximum tax. If Z* is negative, then the core is empty. However, if a benefit 
subsidy in the amount  (absolute value) of Z* were added to NEBtsi, then a sustainable 
allocation would be obtained. Hence, Z* can be viewed as the minimum subsidy to obtain 
a sustainable benefit allocation. 
To illustrate the application of the Shapley method, consider the case of Iraq as 
the player joining other coalitions. The first case is that of Iraq joining the “empty” 
coalitions, with the incremental benefit 
 
min NEBi IBi = φ          ( 2 6 )  
Next, Iraq can join either Turkey or Syria, with the incremental benefits: 
min NEBt NEBti IB t i − =         ( 2 7 )  
min NEBs NEBsi IB s i − =         ( 2 8 )  
Finally, Iraq can join the Turkey-Syria coalition, with the incremental benefits: 
min NEBts NEBtsi IB ts i − =         ( 2 9 ) 
These incremental benefits are then weighted by the corresponding probabilities of 
occurrence, and the result is the Shapley allocation of benefits to Iraq. 
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4.3.   Benefits Under Different Cooperation Scenarios 
  The modeling approach presented in the previous sections has been applied under 
each of 27 parameter scenarios, which are defined as combinations of assumptions 
regarding energy prices, agricultural productivities, and total water resources.  These 
scenarios are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Parameter Scenarios 
Energy Prices (EPR)  EPR = $0  EPR = $25  EPR = $100 
Agricultural Productivity (VALAG) Weights  Water Resources 
(TTF=Bm
3)  Turkey: 1.1  Syria: 1.0  Iraq: 0.9 
59.8 Minimum  A11 A12  A13 
81.9 Average  A21 A22  A23  A 
92.6 Maximum  A31 A32  A33 
Agricultural Productivity (VALAG) Weights  Water Resources 
(TTF=Bm
3)  Turkey: 1.0  Syria: 1.0  Iraq: 1.0 
59.8 Minimum  B11 B12  B13 
81.9 Average  B21 B22  B23  B 
92.6 Maximum  B31 B32  B33 
Agricultural Productivity (VALAG) Weights  Water Resources 
(TTF=Bm
3)  Turkey: 0.9  Syria: 1.0  Iraq: 1.1 
59.8 Minimum  C11 C12  C13 
81.9 Average  C21 C22  C23  C 
92.6 Maximum  C31 C32  C33 
 
The country benefits are presented in Table 6, which is organized along the model 
Table 5.  Table 6 presents the benefits for each country and the total benefit (column) for 
each cooperation scenario: all countries making individual choices (IND) and countries 
making choices within coalitions (TS, TI, SI, TSI - row). In the cases of two-country 
coalitions, Table 6 also provides the benefits for the remaining country (which are 
marked with an underline in the table). The cases where the benefits are the same for all 
cooperation scenarios (IND, TS, TI, SI, TSI) are bold-typed. Italic types are used in the 
total benefit column to indicate cooperation scenarios where total benefits are equal to 
those of the grand coalition (TSI). The cases where a country achieves less than 95% of 
its maximum possible benefits are highlighted, pointing to significant adverse effects. For 
instance, under parameter scenarios A32, Syria achieves a benefit of $ 239,928,000 under 
coalition TI, which represents about 93% of its maximum benefit of $ 258,236,000 under 
the grand coalition (TSI).  As expected, Table 6 points to benefits increasing with  (a)   15 
increasing energy prices (EPR=$0 →  $25 →  $100),  (b) increasing resources availability 
(TTF=59.8 →  81.9 →  92.6 Bm
3),  and (c) a shift of agricultural productivity from Turkey 
(case A) to Iraq (case C).  For instance, the maximum benefit under scenario A11 of 
$1,139,167,000 increases to $7,004,740,000 under scenario C33. The scenarios A31 and 
B31, corresponding to zero energy price and highest resources availability, lead to the 
same solution under all five cooperation scenarios (IND, TS, TI, SI, TSI), of course 
implying a core made of one point only. When EPR=$0, the difference between the 5 
cooperation scenarios (for each parametric scenario) are very small in terms of total 
benefits, except in the case  C11 ($1,280,585 vs. $1,301,699,000). Larger differences take 
place, for individual countries (Syria and Iraq) and in total, when EPR is higher. The 
largest relative adverse effects (highlights) characterize Syria when EPR=$25. 
 
 
4.4.   Core Analyses and Shapley Allocations  
This section presents the results obtained by (1) solving the linear program, and 
(2) applying the Shapley formula. For each of the 27 different parameter scenarios, we 
first find out whether the core exists, and, if it does, whether it is reduced to a unique 
allocation. If it does not, we measure the minimum subsidy needed to create a core. 
Finally, we check whether the Shapley allocations are in the core. Tables 7-12 present the 
results.  
In Table 7 the highlighted cells indicate the cases where there is no core. Out of 
the 27 cases, 6 have no core (B22, B32, C22, C32, C23, C33), 12 have a single-allocation 
core, and 9 have a multiple-allocation core (i.e., there is an infinite number of allocations 
in the core). A core always exists under (1) EPR=$0, and (2) agricultural productivity 
case A (Turkey is more productive). Most of the non-core cases take place when Iraq is 
more productive (case C), when EPR=$25 or $100, and when resources are more 
abundant. This is not surprising, as these situations allow individual countries to achieve 
higher benefits on their own (agriculture for Iraq, energy for Turkey), making it more 
difficult to achieve a sustainable allocation. 
  Table 8 presents the optimal values of the Z variable in the linear program. 
Positive  Z  values characterize multiple-allocation cores, and present the maximum 
extractable taxes leading to a residual single-allocation core. Negative Z values    16 
Table 6: Benefits Under Different Cooperation Scenarios ($1000) 
 
 
characterize non-existing core, and represent the minimum subsidies that would have to 
be added to the grand coalition benefits to create a single-allocation core. Finally, zero Z 
values characterize single-allocation cores. Table 8 shows that positive Z values vary 
between 0.00% and 0.99% of the grand coalition benefits, whereas negative Z values 
vary between 0.00% and 0.06% of these benefits. 
Table 7 also indicates whether the Shapley allocation is in the core or not. When 
energy is not a factor (EPR=$0), all Shapley allocations are in the core. On the other 
hand, in the third column (EPR=$100) none of the Shapley allocations are in core. This is 
 Coalition  Turkey Syria Iraq Total Turkey Syria Iraq Total Turkey Syria Iraq Total
IND 254,509       98,918         784,656         1,138,083       775,635       176,124       889,146       1,840,906       2,642,012    457,449       1,231,575    4,331,037      
TS 254,509       98,918         784,656        1,138,083       773,714       183,244       896,653       1,853,611      2,640,174    469,890       1,206,183   4,316,247      
TI 254,509       98,918        784,656         1,138,083       771,297       164,937      894,049       1,830,282       2,632,618    457,449      1,253,120    4,343,187     
SI 254,509       98,721         785,937         1,139,167      775,635      176,124       889,146       1,840,906       2,642,012   457,449       1,231,575    4,331,037      
TSI 254,509       98,721         785,937         1,139,167      773,714       183,244       896,653       1,853,611      2,632,618    457,449       1,253,120    4,343,187     
IND 255,532       105,423       830,594         1,191,550       1,044,020    226,690       1,002,314    2,273,025       3,712,484    640,196       1,568,091    5,920,771      
TS 255,532       105,423       830,594        1,191,550       1,042,099    233,810       1,003,879    2,279,789      3,710,646    652,638       1,542,133   5,905,417      
TI 255,532       105,423      830,594         1,191,550       1,039,682    215,502      1,008,804    2,263,988       3,703,090    640,196      1,589,636    5,932,922     
SI 255,532       105,226       831,490         1,192,248      1,044,020   226,690       1,002,314    2,273,025       3,712,484   640,196       1,568,091    5,920,771      
TSI 255,532       105,226       831,490         1,192,248      1,042,099    233,810       1,003,879    2,279,789      3,703,090    640,196       1,589,636    5,932,922     
IND 256,024       108,570       834,049         1,198,643      1,173,617    251,116       1,043,653    2,468,385       4,229,395    728,459       1,728,899    6,686,753      
TS 256,024       108,570       834,049         1,198,643      1,171,696    258,236       1,045,218    2,475,149      4,227,557    740,901       1,702,942   6,671,399      
TI 256,024       108,570      834,049         1,198,643      1,169,278    239,928      1,050,142    2,459,349       4,220,000    728,459      1,750,444    6,698,904     
SI 256,024      108,570       834,049         1,198,643      1,173,617   251,116       1,043,653    2,468,385       4,229,395   728,459       1,728,899    6,686,753      
TSI 256,024       108,570       834,049         1,198,643      1,171,696    258,236       1,045,218    2,475,149      4,220,000    728,459       1,750,444    6,698,904     
IND 212,941       98,918         904,815         1,216,675       749,007       172,056       1,033,616    1,954,679       2,635,033    457,449       1,366,866    4,459,348      
TS 212,941       98,918         904,815        1,216,675       748,895       183,244       1,030,162   1,962,301       2,628,745    469,890       1,342,690   4,441,326      
TI 212,941       98,918        904,815         1,216,675       749,007       172,056      1,033,616    1,954,679       2,629,855    457,449      1,390,718    4,478,022      
SI 212,941       98,721         907,023         1,218,684      749,007      172,056       1,033,616    1,954,679       2,635,033   453,986       1,370,392    4,459,411      
TSI 212,941       98,721         907,023         1,218,684      741,320       187,752       1,038,348    1,967,419      2,629,855    453,986       1,394,244    4,478,085     
IND 213,715       105,423       982,204         1,301,342       1,017,142    222,622       1,163,380    2,403,145       3,705,255    640,196       1,721,102    6,066,553      
TS 213,715       105,423       982,204        1,301,342       1,017,030    233,810       1,156,891    2,407,731      3,698,967    652,638       1,695,145   6,046,749      
TI 213,715       105,423      982,204         1,301,342       1,017,142    222,622      1,163,380    2,403,145       3,699,303    640,196      1,745,808    6,085,308     
SI 213,715       105,226       983,746         1,302,687      1,017,142   222,622       1,163,380    2,403,145       3,705,255   640,196       1,721,102    6,066,553      
TSI 213,715       105,226       983,746         1,302,687      1,017,030    233,810       1,156,891    2,407,731      3,699,303    640,196       1,745,808    6,085,308     
IND 214,086       108,570       987,320         1,309,976      1,146,619    247,048       1,204,978    2,598,645       4,222,046    728,459       1,882,171    6,832,675      
TS 214,086       108,570       987,320         1,309,976      1,146,507    258,236       1,198,489    2,603,232      4,215,758    740,901       1,856,213   6,812,871      
TI 214,086       108,570      987,320         1,309,976      1,146,619    247,048      1,204,978    2,598,645       4,215,723    728,459      1,907,287    6,851,469     
SI 214,086      108,570       987,320         1,309,976      1,146,619   247,048       1,204,978    2,598,645       4,222,046   728,459       1,882,171    6,832,675      
TSI 214,086       108,570       987,320         1,309,976      1,146,507    258,236       1,198,489    2,603,232      4,215,723    728,459       1,907,287    6,851,469     
IND 173,876       88,148         1,018,560      1,280,585       728,713       172,056       1,167,286    2,068,056       2,631,268    457,449       1,526,771    4,615,487      
TS 171,373       98,918         1,024,975     1,295,266       721,211       187,752       1,176,901    2,085,863      2,620,530    469,890       1,504,043   4,594,463      
TI 173,876       88,148        1,018,560      1,280,585       728,713       172,056      1,167,286    2,068,056       2,629,855    457,449      1,529,077    4,616,381      
SI 173,876      87,951         1,023,206      1,285,033       728,713      172,056       1,167,286    2,068,056       2,631,268   453,986       1,531,775    4,617,029      
TSI 153,629       98,721         1,049,350      1,301,699      721,211       187,752       1,176,901    2,085,863      2,629,855    453,986       1,534,082    4,617,923     
IND 174,400       94,653         1,130,390      1,399,443       996,598       222,622       1,318,002    2,537,222       3,701,240    640,196       1,895,658    6,237,094      
TS 171,897       105,423       1,133,814     1,411,135       989,096       238,318       1,312,503    2,539,917      3,690,502    652,638       1,869,701   6,212,840      
TI 174,400       94,653        1,130,390      1,399,443       996,598       222,622      1,318,002    2,537,222       3,699,303    640,196      1,898,820    6,238,319     
SI 174,400      94,456         1,132,579      1,401,434       996,598      222,622       1,318,002    2,537,222       3,701,240   640,196       1,895,658    6,237,094      
TSI 171,897       105,226       1,136,003      1,413,126      989,096       238,318       1,312,503    2,539,917      3,699,303    640,196       1,898,820    6,238,319     
IND 174,651       97,800         1,140,591     1,413,043       1,125,954    247,048       1,359,860    2,732,863       4,217,910    728,459       2,056,987    7,003,356      
TS 172,148       108,570       1,140,591     1,421,310      1,118,452    262,744       1,354,361    2,735,557      4,207,172    740,901       2,031,030   6,979,102      
TI 174,651       97,800         1,140,591     1,413,043       1,125,954    247,048      1,359,860    2,732,863       4,215,723    728,459      2,060,558    7,004,740     
SI 174,651      97,800         1,140,591     1,413,043       1,125,954   247,048       1,359,860    2,732,863       4,217,910   728,459       2,056,987    7,003,356      
TSI 172,148       108,570       1,140,591     1,421,310      1,118,452    262,744       1,354,361    2,735,557      4,215,723    728,459       2,060,558    7,004,740       17 
so because, under high energy prices, the Shapley method assigns more power to Turkey 
and Syria, and less to Iraq, hence assigns more benefits to Turkey and Syria, thus putting 
the allocation out of the core. 
 
Table 7: Core Analysis Summary 
The highlighted areas show the cases without a core.  
 
Table 8: Core Analyses: Taxes versus Subsidies (in Parenthesis) and their Percentages of 
the Grand Coalition Benefits ($1000) 
 
 
Table 9 presents the allocations corresponding to (1) the minimum country 
benefits, (2) the single core solution (possibly with subsidies), and (3) the Shapley 
method. Tables 10 and 11 point to the incremental benefits derived by each country 
joining the grand coalition or accepting the Shapley allocation, respectively, over the 
minimum benefits derived from individual action. It is clear that Iraq is the major 
beneficiary of these allocations when the energy price is highest (EPR=$100), with 
Turkey as a significant secondary beneficiary when Turkey’s agricultural productivity is 
also highest (case A). However, Turkey’s incremental benefits are strongly reduced under 
Iraq’s strong agricultural productivity (case C). The incremental benefits to Syria are 
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Shapley in or out 
of the Core
A11 YES Single IN A12 YES Multiple IN A13 YES Single NOT IN
A21 YES Single IN A22 YES Multiple NOT IN A23 YES Single NOT IN
A31 YES Single IN A32 YES Multiple NOT IN A33 YES Single NOT IN
B11 YES Single IN B12 YES Multiple IN B13 YES Multiple NOT IN
B21 YES Single IN B22 NO B23 YES Single NOT IN
B31 YES Single IN B32 NO B33 YES Single NOT IN
C11 YES Multiple IN C12 YES Multiple IN C13 YES Multiple NOT IN
C21 YES Multiple IN C22 NO C23 NO
C31 YES Single IN C32 NO C33 NO
 Scenario   Tax/Subsidy Z  Z/B (%)
 Grand Coalition 
Benefit (B)   Scenario   Tax/Subsidy Z  Z/B (%)
 Grand Coalition 
Benefit (B)   Scenario   Tax/Subsidy Z  Z/B (%)
 Grand Coalition 
Benefit (B) 
A11 0 0.00                     1,139,167  A12 7,507                   0.40                     1,853,611  A13 0 0.00                     4,343,187 
A21 0 0.00                     1,192,248  A22 1,565                   0.07                     2,279,789  A23 0 0.00                     5,932,922 
A31 0 0.00                     1,198,643  A32 1,565                   0.06                     2,475,149  A33 0 0.00                     6,698,904 
B11 0 0.00                     1,218,684  B12 5,118                   0.26                     1,967,419  B13 63                        0.00                     4,478,085 
B21 0 0.00                     1,302,687  B22 (951)                    -0.04                     2,407,731  B23 0 0.00                     6,085,308 
B31 0 0.00                     1,309,976  B32 (951)                    -0.04                     2,603,232  B33 0 0.00                     6,851,469 
C11 12,847                 0.99                     1,301,699  C12 9,614                   0.46                     2,085,863  C13 366                      0.01                     4,617,923 
C21 5,416                   0.38                     1,413,126  C22 (1,402)                 -0.06                     2,539,917  C23 (239)                    0.00                     6,238,319 
C31 0 0.00                     1,421,310  C32 (1,402)                 -0.05                     2,735,557  C33 (160)                    0.00                     7,004,740   18 
Table 9: Minimum Benefit, Core, Shapley, and Tax Allocations ($1000) 
 Z shows the allocation of the tax, using as weights the Shapley values, and provides additional 
country benefits, which may be added to the core allocations. 
 
Table 10: Core Allocations Minus Minimum Country Benefits ($1000) 
The highlighted area shows where the side payments go. 
 
 
6.   CONCLUSION 
  The major contribution of this paper is, first, the development of the ETRBM as a 
backbone model, and, second,  its application, using the best available data, to analyses of 
whether it is possible to find a distribution of the total ETRBM benefits to the three 
riparian countries – Turkey, Syria, and Iraq – that will provide them incentives to join the  
Allocation Turkey Syria Iraq Turkey Syria Iraq Turkey Syria Iraq
Minimum 254,509       98,918         784,656       775,635       164,937       889,146       2,642,012    457,449       1,206,183   
Core 254,509       100,002       784,656       776,199       180,759       889,146       2,652,616    457,449       1,233,123   
Shapley 254,509       99,460         785,198       782,695       177,309       893,607       2,654,087    463,448       1,225,652   
Z 0                  0                  0                  3,170           718              3,619           0                  0                  0                 
Minimum 255,532       105,423       830,594       1,044,020    215,502       1,002,314    3,712,484    640,196       1,542,133   
Core 255,532       106,121       830,594       1,046,172    229,738       1,002,314    3,723,087    640,196       1,569,638   
Shapley 255,532       105,772       830,943       1,049,365    225,365       1,005,059    3,724,653    646,290       1,561,979   
Z 0                  0                  0                  720              155              690              0                  0                  0                 
Minimum 256,024       108,570       834,049       1,173,617    239,928       1,043,653    4,229,395    728,459       1,702,942   
Core 256,024       108,570       834,049       1,175,768    254,164       1,043,653    4,239,998    728,459       1,730,447   
Shapley 256,024       108,570       834,049       1,178,961    249,791       1,046,398    4,241,564    734,552       1,722,788   
Z 0 0 0 745              158              662              0                  0                  0                 
Minimum 212,941       98,918         904,815       749,007       172,056       1,030,162    2,635,033    457,449       1,342,690   
Core 212,941       100,928       904,815       752,461       179,678       1,030,162    2,641,187    457,449       1,379,386   
Shapley 212,941       99,923         905,820       755,675       178,725       1,033,019    2,649,425    462,535       1,366,125   
Z 0                  0                  0                  1,966           465              2,687           37                6                  19               
Minimum 213,715       105,423       982,204       1,017,142    222,622       1,156,891    3,705,255    640,196       1,695,145   
Core 213,715       106,768       982,204       1,022,680    228,160       1,157,842    3,711,408    640,196       1,733,703   
Shapley 213,715       106,096       982,877       1,021,599    227,079       1,159,054    3,719,984    645,548       1,719,776   
Z 0                  0                  0                  404              90                458              0                  0                  0                 
Minimum 214,086       108,570       987,320       1,146,619    247,048       1,198,489    4,222,046    728,459       1,856,213   
Core 214,086       108,570       987,320       1,152,157    252,586       1,199,440    4,228,199    728,459       1,894,810   
Shapley 214,086       108,570       987,320       1,151,075    251,505       1,200,652    4,236,794    733,811       1,880,864   
Z 0                  0                  0                  421              92                439              0                  0                  0                 
Minimum 173,876       88,148         1,018,560    728,713       172,056       1,167,286    2,631,268    457,449       1,504,043   
Core 177,695       92,596         1,018,560    728,713       180,250       1,167,286    2,631,796    458,625       1,527,137   
Shapley 180,810       97,305         1,023,584    736,014       179,358       1,170,491    2,635,787    462,291       1,519,845   
Z 1,785           960              10,103         3,392           827              5,395           209              37                120             
Minimum 174,400       94,653         1,130,390    996,598       222,622       1,312,503    3,701,240    640,196       1,869,701   
Core 180,675       96,645         1,130,390    1,000,695    226,719       1,313,905    3,702,704    640,436       1,895,419   
Shapley 179,675       100,924       1,132,527    999,778       225,802       1,314,336    3,706,462    644,807       1,887,050   
Z 689              387              4,341           552              125              726              142              25                72               
Minimum 174,651       97,800         1,140,591    1,125,954    247,048       1,354,361    4,217,910    728,459       2,031,030   
Core 174,651       106,067       1,140,591    1,130,051    251,145       1,355,764    4,219,454    728,619       2,056,827   
Shapley 178,785       101,934       1,140,591    1,129,135    250,228       1,356,194    4,223,212    733,069       2,048,458   
Z 0                  0                  0                  579              128              695              96                17                47               
Scenario Turkey  Syria Iraq Scenario Turkey Syria Iraq Scenario Turkey Syria Iraq
A11 01 , 0 8 4         0 A12 565                15,822        0 A13 10,604           0 26,940          
A21 06 9 8            0 A22 2,151             14,236        0 A23 10,603           0 27,505          
A31 00 0 A32 2,151             14,236        0 A33 10,603           0 27,505          
B11 02 , 0 1 0         0 B12 3,454             7,622         0 B13 6,154             0 36,696          
B21 01 , 3 4 5         0 B22 5,538             5,538         951                B23 6,153             0 38,558          
B31 00 0 B32 5,538             5,538         951                B33 6,153             0 38,597          
C11 3,819          4,448         0 C12 08 , 1 9 3         0 C13 528                1,176         23,094          
C21 6,275          1,992         0 C22 4,097             4,097         1,402             C23 1,464             239            25,718          
C31 08 , 2 6 7         0 C32 4,097             4,097         1,402             C33 1,544             160            25,798            19 
 
Table 11: Shapley Allocations Minus Minimum Country Benefits ($1000) 
 
 
water allocation plan that provides the maximum aggregate benefits. This assessment has 
required an in-depth analysis of the decision-making processes of the three countries and 
any of their coalitions, through extensive adaptations of the ETRBM. Using concepts and 
methods of cooperative game theory, we find that, out of the 27 parameter scenarios 
considered, 21 were characterized by a non-empty core, where such cooperation can be 
rationally induced. The 6 empty-core cases can be transformed into core cases with a 
small subsidy, at most 0.06% of the total joint benefit. These cases correspond to high 
energy prices and high Iraqi agricultural productivity, which clearly strongly benefit 
Turkey and Iraq acting independently. The Shapley allocation, which is based on the 
incremental economic power of the participants, also reflects these energy and 
agricultural productivity effects. 
 
REFERENCES 
Altinbilek, H. D. (1997). Water and Land Resources Development in Southeastern 
Turkey. Water Resources Development, 13(3), 311-332. 
 
Bagis, A. I. (1989) The Cradle of Civilization. Istanbul: Gelisim Yayinlari A. S.  
 
Bilen, O. (1994). Prospect for Technical Cooperation in the Euphrates – Tigris Basin in 
eds. Biswas, A. K. (1994) International Waters of the Middle East: From Euphrates-
Tigris to Nile. Bombay: Oxford University Press. 
 
Booker, J. F. & Young, R. A. (1994). Modeling Intrastate and Interstate Markets for Colorado 
River Water Resources. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 26, 66-87. 
 
CIA (1998) Homepage: http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html 
 
Dinar, A. & Letey, J. (1991). Agricultural Water Marketing, Allocative Efficiency, and Drainage 
Reduction. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 20, 210-223. 
 
Scenario Turkey  Syria Iraq Scenario Turkey Syria Iraq Scenario Turkey Syria Iraq
A11 05 4 2            542                A12 7,060             12,372        4,461             A13 12,075           5,999         19,469          
A21 03 4 9            349                A22 5,344             9,863         2,745             A23 12,169           6,093         19,846          
A31 00 0 A32 5,344             9,863         2,745             A33 12,169           6,094         19,846          
B11 01 , 0 0 5         1,005             B12 6,668             6,668         2,858             B13 14,392           5,086         23,434          
B21 06 7 2            672                B22 4,457             4,456         2,163             B23 14,729           5,352         24,631          
B31 00 0 B32 4,456             4,456         2,163             B33 14,748           5,352         24,650          
C11 6,933          9,157         5,024             C12 7,301             7,301         3,205             C13 4,519             4,843         15,802          
C21 5,275          6,271         2,137             C22 3,180             3,180         1,833             C23 5,223             4,610         17,350          
C31 4,133          4,133         0 C32 3,180             3,180         1,833             C33 5,302             4,610         17,429            20 
Dinar, A. & Wolf A. (1994) Middle East Hydropolitics and Equity Measures for Water-Sharing 
Agreements. Journal of Social, Political & Economic Studies, 19(1), 69-93. 
 
Dinar, A. & Wolf, A. (1994). International Markets for Water and Potential for Regional 
Cooperation: Economic and Political Perspectives in the Western Middle East. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 43, 43-66. 
 
Gibbons, D. C. (1986). The Economic Value of Water. Washington, DC: The Johns Hopkins 
Press. 
 
Hirshleifer, J., De Haven, J. C., & Milliman, J. W. (1969). Water Supply: Economics, 
Technology, and Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Howe, C. W. & Easter, K. W. (1971). Interbasin Transfer of Water: Economic Issues and 
Impacts. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press. 
 
Howitt, R. E., Mann, D. E., & Vaux, H. J. Jr.. (1982). The Economics of Water 
Allocation. In Engelbert E. A. & Scheuring, A. F. (Eds.), Competition for California 
Water Alternative Resolutions. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Kliot, N. (1994). Water resources and conflict in the Middle East. London: Roudledge. 
 
Kolars, J. F. (1986). Hydro-geographic background to the utilization of international rivers in the 
Middle East. American Society of International Law Proceedings, 80, 250-258 
 
Kolars, J. F. (1992). Water Resources of the Middle East. Canadian Journal of Development 
Studies, Special Issue. 
   
Kolars, J. F. (1994). Problems of International River Management, in eds. Biswas, A. K. (1994) 
International Waters of the Middle East: From Euphrates-Tigris to Nile. Bombay: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Kolars, J. F. & Mitchell, W. A. (1991). The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia 
Development Project. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press 
 
Kucukmehmetoglu, M (2002).  Water Resources Allocation and Conflicts – The Case of the 
Euphrates and the Tigris.  Ph.D. Dissertation, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. 
 
Roger, P. (1969). A Game Theory Approach to the Problems of International River Basin. Water 
Resources Research, 5, 749-760. 
 
Roger, P. (1993). The Value of Cooperation Resolving International River Basin Disputes. 
Natural Resources Forum, May, 117-131. 
 
Wolf, A. T. & Dinar, A. (1994). Middle East Hydropolitics and Equity Measures for Water-
Sharing Agreements. The Journal of Social, Political & Economic Studies, 19(1), 69-93. 
 
 